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Abstract Like true memories, false memories are capable of
priming answers to insight-based problems. Recent research
has attempted to extend this paradigm to more advanced
problem-solving tasks, including those involving verbal ana-
logical reasoning. However, these experiments are
constrained inasmuch as problem solutions could be generat-
ed via spreading activation mechanisms (much like false
memories themselves) rather than using complex reasoning
processes. In three experiments we examined false memory
priming of complex analogical reasoning tasks in the absence
of simple semantic associations. In Experiment 1, we demon-
strated the robustness of false memory priming in analogical
reasoning when backward associative strength among the
problem terms was eliminated. In Experiments 2a and 2b,
we extended these findings by demonstrating priming on new-
ly created homonym analogies that can only be solved by
inhibiting semantic associations within the analogy. Overall,
the findings of the present experiments provide evidence that
the efficacy of false memory priming extends to complex an-
alogical reasoning problems.
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Memory is highly flexible and reconstructive, designed to
retain information about the past, interpret the present, and
support simulations of future events (e.g., Howe, 2011;
Newman & Lindsay, 2009; Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques,
2011). Interestingly, recent research has shown that memory is
highly functional, regardless of whether we are talking about
memories for events that actually occurred (i.e., true memo-
ries) or for self-generated memories of events that did not
occur (i.e., false memories). For example, a significant body
of research has demonstrated that true memories are able to
prime performance on related memory tasks (e.g., implicit
memory; see Gulan & Valerjev, 2010) as well as non-
memory tasks such as verbal problem solving (e.g.,
Mednick, Mednick, & Mednick, 1964).
Priming refers to Ba change in the ability to identify, pro-
duce, or classify an item as a result of a prior encounter with
that item, or a related item^ (Schacter, Gallo, & Kensinger,
2007, p. 356). In the case of analogical reasoning, for exam-
ple, there is a well-established body of evidence demonstrat-
ing that people are able to transfer directly their prior memo-
ries of problems and their solutions in order to assist them in
tackling new, related problems (e.g., Bassok & Holyoak,
1989; Richland, Zur, & Holyoak, 2007; for a recent review,
see Holyoak, 2012). Although such analogical reasoning pro-
cesses appear to rely largely on direct or explicit memory
retrieval, there is also evidence that prior memories can influ-
ence reasoning and problem solving through intuitive mecha-
nisms that operate indirectly or implicitly. Such intuitive pro-
cesses appear to have a basis either in tacitly learned memory
associations (e.g., Osman & Stavy, 2006; Sloman, 1996) or in
rules that were once deliberatively acquired but which have
been practiced so extensively that they have reached a state of
automaticity in procedural memory (e.g., Kahneman & Klein,
2009).
Kokinov (1990; Kokinov & Petrov, 2001), for example,
has shown that implicit memory priming can facilitate perfor-
mance with complex deductive, inductive, and analogical rea-
soning problems, benefitting both the strategy taken and the
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success of the problem-solving process. Schunn and Dunbar
(1996) have provided further support for priming effects in
analogical problem solving, demonstrating that conceptual
knowledge of one knowledge domain (i.e., biochemistry)
can spontaneously influence complex reasoning in another,
unrelated knowledge domain (i.e., molecular genetics) via im-
plicit priming, leading to facilitated problem solving as mea-
sured through both accuracy and the speed of solution gener-
ation. Schunn and Dunbar’s sophisticated controls and mea-
sures also allowed for any involvement of explicit memory
processes to be ruled out as a cause of solution success in the
implicit priming conditions.
More recently, it has been discovered that it is not just true
memories that can prime performance on cognitive tasks such
as problem solving but that false memories can also have key
beneficial effects. A common procedure used to generate false
memories is the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) para-
digm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Here,
participants are presented with words (e.g., snooze, doze,
wake, rest) that are all semantic associates of a non-
presented word or so-called critical lure (e.g., sleep). When
asked to remember the words on the list, participants frequent-
ly remember the critical lure (a false memory) along with the
presented items. Using this paradigm, it has been shown that
false memories can prime solutions to problem-solving tasks
such as insight-based Compound Remote Associate Tasks
(CRATs; see Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, & Ball, 2010) and
verbal proportional analogies (Howe, Threadgold, Norbury,
Garner, & Ball, 2013).
The latter problems (i.e., verbal proportional analogies)
involve the presentation of items that have the form a is to b
as c is to d, where participants are given the a, b, and c terms
and are asked to generate the missing d term (e.g., Ball, Hoyle,
& Towse, 2010; Goswami, 2001; Goswami & Brown, 1989,
1990). For example, the participant might be given the prob-
lem ‘dog is to kennel as bird is to ?’ and asked to generate the
solution term. The optimal way to solve such analogies in-
volves identifying the relation that exists between the a and
b terms (in this case, ‘inhabits’) and thenmapping this relation
onto the c term (‘bird’) in order to generate the answer ‘nest.’
Proportional analogies of this type are non-trivial, especially
for children, but even adult performance is rarely error free
(e.g., see Green, Fugelsang, & Dunbar, 2006). Such problems
therefore frequently feature in intelligence tests (Sternberg,
1977) and in academic examinations such as the statutory
assessment test.
Although non-trivial, proportional analogies are typically
easier for adults to solve than are many other forms of com-
plex analogy problems that have been studied in the literature,
which tend to involve the identification and mapping of mul-
tiple, hierarchically embedded ‘systems’ of relations (for
pioneering research with such problems, see Gentner &
Toupin, 1986; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Keane, 1987). We
acknowledge that proportional analogies do not involve the
sophistication of complex analogies of the type that have dom-
inated much of the analogical reasoning literature, and that are
typically very challenging for adults to solve in the absence of
directive hints to use specific past experiences. Nevertheless, a
major advantage of studying false memory priming effects
with proportional analogies derives from the way in which
such problems afford an opportunity to impose very strict
controls on the terms that they are composed of. As will be
shown in the experiments that we present below, such controls
facilitate the examination of some unique aspects of analogi-
cal problem solving that have hitherto remained unexplored.
Although it has been established that both true and false
memories can effectively prime solutions to problem-solving
tasks (including proportional analogies), an interesting devel-
opment has been that false memories can actually be more
effective primes for problem solving than true memories
(Howe et al., 2013; Howe, Wilkinson, & Monaghan, 2012;
Wilkinson, 2014). This is consistent with the literature
documenting the different strengths of true and false memo-
ries where the latter have been shown to be stronger than the
former (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, & Brandse, 1995; Howe,
Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010a; McDermott,
1996). For example, whereas truememories decline over time,
false memories persist across retention intervals (days, weeks;
Brainerd et al., 1995; McDermott, 1996) and negative false
memories can actually increase over time (e.g., Howe et al.,
2010a).
That false memories can be stronger than true memories
has been attributed to the different ways in which they are
formed. Specifically, false memories tend to be self-generated
(i.e., occurring spontaneously and automatically as a result of
internal semantic activation) whereas true memories are often
other-generated (e.g., presented on a list by the experimenter).
This self- versus other-generated difference holds regardless
of the nature of the paradigm being used and has been ob-
served using the standard DRM paradigm (e.g., Howe, 2005),
when participants are remembering stories, pictures, and
videos (e.g., Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Sauerland, &
Raymaekers, 2013; Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Smeets, & Moritz,
2014), and when entire memories are being implanted (e.g.,
Otgaar, Smeets, & Peters, 2012). The efficacy of self-
generated information is underpinned by a substantial body
of research showing that self-generated information is not on-
ly encoded at a deeper level but is also significantly more
likely to be remembered than other-generated (i.e., experi-
menter presented) information (Bjorklund, 2004; Slamecka
& Graf, 1978). Thus, if priming effects are monotonically
related to memory strength, then false memories should be
better primes than true memories, particularly following a de-
lay. The benefit of falsely remembered items in priming solu-
tions to problem-solving tasks (e.g., CRATs) has been
established both with adults (Howe et al., 2010b) and children
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(Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011). Howe et al.
(2013) attempted to extend this effect to more complex rea-
soning tasks by using false memories to prime solutions to
analogical reasoning problems. Like the research with
CRATs, both adults and children were primed on verbal pro-
portional analogies of the form a is to b as c is to d and were
asked to generate the d term. The solution to six of the nine
verbal analogies was also the critical lure from previously
presented DRM lists (e.g., desert is to hot as arctic is to cold,
where cold was both the solution to the analogy and the crit-
ical lure of a DRM list). For the six analogies that were primed
(the remaining three were not primed), three were primed by
having the critical lure presented as a list item (a ‘true’ or
other-generated memory) and the remaining three were
primed by not having the critical lure as a list item (a ‘false’
or self-generated memory). The results showed that, unsur-
prisingly, adults solved the analogies more quickly than chil-
dren. Importantly, both adults and children solved verbal anal-
ogies more quickly when primed with a false memory than
when unprimed or when primed by a true memory (there were
no differences between the latter two conditions).
Although these effects for false memory priming of analo-
gies are interesting, they are also somewhat limited. This is
because Howe et al. (2013) used relatively straightforward
analogies that were solved quickly and easily by children
and adults alike. Although this allowed for a demonstration
of priming effects in both adults and children, a downside is
that priming in this context represents activation of simple
semantic associates and not the priming of complex reasoning
relations themselves.
To explain, the distinction between the priming of simple
semantic associations versus the priming of more complex,
analytic problem solving is of particular concern in the verbal
analogies literature, where a debate exists concerning the
mechanisms by which proportional analogies are solved.
Some researchers (e.g., Green et al., 2006) suggest that pro-
portional analogies are solved analytically in the optimal man-
ner described above, which involves mapping the relation
between the a and b terms onto the c term in order to generate
the answer d. Others (e.g., Sternberg & Nigro, 1980), howev-
er, have proposed that proportional analogies are typically
solved using semantic associations (particularly by children;
e.g., see Ball et al., 2010; Cheshire, Muldoon, Francis, Lewis,
& Ball, 2007; Siegler & Svetina, 2002) in a similar manner to
the spreading activation processes thought to underlie the so-
lutions to CRATs. Given the relatively simplistic nature of
Howe et al.’s (2013) verbal analogies, solutions could have
been generated using associations generated via spreading ac-
tivation. These analogies could be solved analytically through
relational mapping, but given the high semantic association
between the c and d terms, it was equally possible that these
analogies provided more of a semantic or word association
task than a true test of analogical reasoning. This could mean
that what Howe et al. (2013) demonstrated was not the ability
of false memories to prime analogical reasoning via a
relational-mapping process but simply their ability to prime
closely related semantic associations (e.g., where the b term
‘hot’ or the c term ‘arctic’ simply primed the d term ‘cold’).
Therefore, a task is needed that can be used to demonstrate the
ability of false memories to prime the solutions to complex
reasoning problems in the absence of simple semantic
associations.
The purpose of the present research was therefore twofold.
First, we wanted to develop new analogical reasoning tasks,
ones that rely less heavily on simple semantic associations and
instead are more dependent on analytic, relational mapping.
Second, we wanted to investigate whether false memories are
still capable of priming the solutions to these complex analog-
ical reasoning tasks when these solutions rely less heavily on
spreading activation among a single set of semantic associa-
tions. In order to do this, we have developed two new sets of
analogical reasoning tasks.
In Experiment 1, we created a set of verbal proportional
analogies that are considerably less semantically related than
those used in the previous experiment (Howe et al., 2013).
Specifically, by controlling backward associative strength
(BAS; a numerical measure of the likelihood that a target word
will be produced given a cue word) it was possible to reduce
(or in most cases eliminate) the semantic relationship between
the a to d, b to d, and c to d terms. We then calculated an
overall cumulative BAS score for the target word d (solution)
being produced as a simple associate of the cue words (a, b,
and c terms) provided in the analogy. The lower this cumula-
tive BAS score, the less likely the analogical problem is to be
solved by spreading activation of associations in memory
from the analogy terms alone, independent of analytic reason-
ing. When we calculated cumulative BAS for the analogies
used in Howe et al. (2013), the value was 3.94. In contrast, the
cumulative BAS of the analogies used in our first experiment
was 0.23. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) con-
firmed that there was a significant difference between the cu-
mulative BAS of the analogies in the experiment reported by
Howe et al. and those used in our Experiment 1. Thus,
Experiment 1 provides a more appropriate demonstration of
false memory priming of analogy problems requiring true an-
alogical reasoning rather than problems that merely tap into
semantic associations of memory, such as those reported in
Howe et al. (2013).
In Experiments 2a and 2b, we extended the priming of
analogical reasoning based around an analytic mapping pro-
cess (as opposed to simple semantic associations) by develop-
ing a new type of analogical reasoning task called a homonym
analogy task. In this task, we used homonyms, which are
words that are pronounced the same but have very different
contextual meanings (e.g., words such as score). In this way
we could ensure that analogies were more likely to be solved
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using analytic mapping of the relational term and not just
spreading activation among semantic associations.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we investigated false memory priming of
verbal proportional analogies using a set of normed analogical
reasoning problems in which we limited the cumulative BAS
of the terms provided in the analogical problem.
Method
Participants
The participants were twenty-five 18-year-old undergraduate
students who were fluent in English. Recruitment took place
via a participant recruitment system, and each participant re-
ceived £3.50 for 30 minutes of participation time. Written
informed consent was obtained from each participant prior
to taking part in the experiment, and participants were
debriefed following their participation.
Design and materials
A within-participant design was employed consisting of one
factor with two levels (Priming: Unprimed or False Memory
Priming). The experiment was programmed using Psyscript
(an experimental generator) and run by an Apple Macintosh
computer. Eight normed proportional analogical reasoning
problems (of the format a is to b as c is to d) were used in this
experiment (see Table 1). These analogies were a subset se-
lected from a previous norming study (Howe, Threadgold,
Garner, Bland, & Ball, 2015) in which we asked 50 partici-
pants to generate the answers to 50 newly created proportional
analogies, with a maximum of 60 seconds being given for the
generation of an answer to each problem, after which the
correct solution was displayed. Analogies were selected for
the present experiment if their normed solution rate fell be-
tween 20 % and 80 %, and if the strength of the BAS of the
associated DRM list allowed for the attainment of effective
experimental controls, as discussed below.
The subset of eight analogical reasoning problems that
were selected (see Table 1) had normed solution rates in the
range of 34 % to 76 %. These eight problems were divided
into two groups of four analogies, with the presentation of
these groups being counterbalanced across participants in the
experiment in terms of whether they were unprimed or primed
by the prior presentation of a DRM list. The four analogies in
each group were equated on the BAS of the DRM list items
and on their normed solution rates (Group 1 analogies—earth,
lion, stone, iron: Mean DRM BAS = .20, Mean Solution Rate
= 61.5 %; Group 2 analogies - allow, spider, needle, hair:
Mean DRM BAS = .14, Mean Solution Rate = 53.5 %).
Because BAS is a widely used measure of the strength of a
DRM list in producing false memories, it is important to con-
trol for Mean DRM BAS level across conditions (e.g.
Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001).
Furthermore, to provide an indication of the semantic
strength of the analogy the BAS of the a to d, b to d, and c
to d relationships (e.g., the likelihood of producing the solu-
tion d when asked to provide a semantic associate of a, b, and
c) were totaled, providing a cumulative BAS score for each
analogical problem. All BAS values were selected from the
normed associates presented by Nelson, McEvoy, and
Schreiber (1998). There was no significant difference
in the cumulative BAS for the a to d, b to d, and c
to d relationships between each group of four analogies
(Cumulative BAS: Group 1 = .06, Group 2 = .17, p >
.05). All eight analogies had a zero BAS score for the a
to d and b to d relationships. Three analogies (those
with the solutions iron, hair, and needle) had an above
zero, but still very low, c to d BAS score (.06, .14, and
.03, respectively). Overall, then, there was a very low
likelihood of the a and b cue words in any of the
analogies producing solution words by spreading activa-
tion alone.
For each analogical reasoning problem there was a linked
DRM list consisting of 12 associated words where the critical
lure was also the solution to the problem (see Appendix A for
DRM lists and BAS scores for each list). DRM lists contain-
ing 12 associate terms were used. The use of 12 associates is
consistent with early applications of the DRM paradigm
(Deese, 1959) and has been frequently shown to induce false
recall of the critical lure (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The
DRM lists were either selected from standard sources (e.g.,
Roediger et al., 2001) or were constructed based on the
normed associates presented by Nelson et al. (1998). Words
on the DRM lists did not appear as part of the analogical
reasoning problems.
Table 1 Mean solution rates and times (with standard deviations in
parenthesis) for the normed proportional analogies used in Experiment 1
Analogy with solution Mean Solution
rate
Mean solution
time (s)
peace : dove :: courage : lion 0.76 (.43) 4.56 (3.35)
prevent : restrict :: enable : allow 0.74 (.44) 6.02 (3.71)
car : roundabout :: moon : earth 0.62 (.49) 5.99 (3.25)
four : cat :: eight : spider 0.60 (.49) 5.45 (4.10)
egg : yolk :: plum : stone 0.56 (.50) 4.57 (2.32)
wash : clean :: press : iron 0.52 (.51) 7.08 (4.62)
leopard : spots :: chest : hair 0.46 (.50) 9.31 (6.45)
watch : cog :: compass : needle 0.34 .(47) 5.11 (2.43)
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Procedure
Participants were informed that they would be completing two
distinct tasks: a memory task and problem-solving task.
Therefore, it was never explicitly stated to participants that
the word lists were linked to the analogical reasoning prob-
lems in any way, or that the memory task could be used to help
solve the analogical reasoning problems.1 Participants initially
listened to four DRM lists played to them through headphones
via a computer. DRM items were presented at the rate of one
word every two seconds. Lists were played individually and in
a random order for each participant, but the order of the items
in the list remained constant for each participant. Following
presentation of a list there was a brief filler task (consisting of
two simple arithmetic calculations on screen) before partici-
pants were asked to write down as many words as they could
remember on a piece of paper, provided. Participants were not
given a time limit to recall these words and were merely
instructed to proceed when they had recalled as many words
as they could from the given list. Following the completion of
all four DRM lists, participants were asked to turn their paper
over so they could not see their recall answers before
attempting to solve eight analogical problems, presented one
at a time to them on the computer screen.
Presentation of the eight analogical problems was random-
ized for each participant. Analogical problems were presented
in the format ‘a is to b as c is to _____’ in the center of the
computer screen. Participants were required to click a button
as soon as they had their final answer to an analogy, and they
then needed to type their answer into the space provided on
screen. The timer began as soon as participants viewed the
analogy on screen and ended once participants had clicked
the button signaling that they had their final answer.
Participants received a maximum of 60 seconds to generate
each answer, after which the correct answer was displayed. On
providing their answer to each analogy, participants viewed
the complete analogy with the correct answer on screen.
Participants completed eight analogies in total, four of which
had been primed by the associated DRM list and four of which
were unprimed.
Results
The mean analogy solution rate (proportion) and the mean
analogy solution time (seconds) were calculated for each par-
ticipant and analyzed in separate ANOVAs. For the primed
analogical reasoning problems, solution rates and times were
further conditionalized according to whether a false memory
had been produced during recall of the DRM list relevant to
that analogy. Conditionalizing primed performance in this
manner has been widely used in previous research investigat-
ing the priming capacity of false memories (e.g., Howe et al.,
2010b, 2013). Despite the reduction in items per cell when
responses are conditionalized (although there was still suffi-
cient power to detect differences should they exist as the ma-
jority of participants, over 65 %, contributed data to all three
cells), it is imperative that this distinction is made because
previous research has consistently shown that priming is only
effective when the false memory is actually produced at on a
memory test. Therefore, there were three levels of priming for
the analyses that we report below: unprimed vs. false memory
primed with no false recall vs. false memory primed with false
recall. The mean false memory proportion was .26 (SD = .13)
with the majority of participants (84 %) having one or more
false memories.
Solution rates
There was a significant main effect of priming for solution
rates, F(2, 24) = 6.17, p < .05, η2p = .34. As can be seen in
Fig. 1, and which was confirmed using post hoc pairwise
comparisons, solution rates were significantly higher in the
false memory priming condition when a false memory had
been produced at recall (M = .94, SE = .04) compared to either
false memory priming where no false memory was produced
(M = .60, SE = .02, p < .05) or the unprimed condition (M =
.62, SE = .06, p < .05). There was no significant difference in
solution rates between the latter two conditions (p > .05).
Solution times
Like the solution rate data, there was a significant main effect
of priming for solution times, F(2, 20) = 4.72, p < .05, η2p =
.32. As can be seen in Fig. 2, and which was confirmed using
post hoc pairwise comparisons, solution times were signifi-
cantly faster in the false memory priming condition when a
false memory had been produced (M = 3.79 s, SE = .43)
1 In fact, when participants were later asked during debriefing whether
they thought the two tasks were in any way related, over 95 % say that
they did not believe that the two tasks were connected.
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Fig. 1 Mean proportion of solution rates (with standard errors) as a
function of priming condition
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compared to either the false memory priming with no false
memory (M = 9.05 s, SE = 1.51, p < .05) or the unprimed
conditions (M = 10.54 s, SE = 2.77, p < .05). There was no
significant difference between solution times in these latter
two conditions (p > .05).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 are unique inasmuch as they show
that having a false memory is critical for the priming of ana-
logical reasoning that requires a relational mapping process to
arrive at a solution. That is, only when participants recalled the
critical lure did false memories prime the solutions to verbal
proportional analogies. When participants failed to recall the
critical lure, performance (solution rates and solution times)
on analogical reasoning problems was no better than when
solutions had not been primed. Thus, we can conclude that
the production of the critical lure is imperative for the success
of a false memory priming effect in analogical reasoning.
These findings also provide an important and unique dem-
onstration of the benefit of false memories, one that extends
our knowledge of their ability to prime performance not just
on related memory tasks but on more complex problem-
solving tasks as well. Although previous research has been
influential in establishing evidence for the ability of false
memories to prime the solutions to insight problems (e.g.,
Howe et al., 2010b, 2011), this is the first experiment to ex-
tend these findings to more complex analogical reasoning
tasks, ones that require a process of analogical mapping, and
that cannot be solved solely by activating simple spreading
activation among semantic associations (as was the case in
Howe et al., 2013).
Making this distinction is particularly important for theo-
ries of analogical reasoning, where a debate exists concerning
the mechanisms by which proportional analogies are solved.
Here, some researchers argue that analogies are solved by a
process of semantic association and not by using analogical
mapping. The results of the present experiment suggest that
when one limits the availability of semantic associations be-
tween the analogy terms and the solution, it is still possible
both to solve these analogies (60 % of the time) and, impor-
tantly, to prime these solutions using false memories.
Experiment 2a
Experiment 1 utilized a set of normed verbal proportional
analogies in which we limited the likelihood of the target
solution being arrived at using spreading activation through
semantic associates. However, despite this control, one could
argue that this association, rather than being removed, was
simply more remote than in the analogies used previously by
Howe at al. (2013). That is, the analogies presented in
Experiment 1 might still have been solved via spreading acti-
vation, albeit requiring the activation of more distant or weak-
er associations (for how such a process might work, see
Nelson, Kitto, Galea, McEvoy, & Bruza, 2013; Nelson,
McEvoy, & Pointer, 2003).
If semantic association did still play a role in solving ana-
logical reasoning problems in Experiment 1, what would hap-
pen if we were to remove the influence of associations by
ensuring that the proportional analogy could only be solved
via an analytic mapping process? Moreover, what would hap-
pen if analogical problem solving purposefully required par-
ticipants to inhibit any semantic associations that may be ap-
parent within the proportional analogy?
In order to examine these questions, we developed a task
that not only removed the use of semantic association as a
solution strategy but also required the inhibition of dominant
semantic associations within the analogy problem in order
obtain the solution using an analytic mapping process. We
did this by creating a new type of verbal proportional analogy
termed a homonym analogy. Homonym analogies take the
standard form of a verbal proportional analogy, that is, a is
to b as c is to d. For example, ‘fur is to bear as bark is to tree.’
However, these analogies differ in a number of important
ways to the standard verbal proportional analogies used in
Experiment 1.
To see how these homonym analogies work, consider the
following example: fur is to bear, as bark is to: __? Rather
than have participants solve these analogies in the usual man-
ner, we gave participants four multiple-choice options, in this
case, branch, dog, meow, and tree (see Table 2). In this exam-
ple, the a and b terms, fur and bear, create a context related to
the category of animals, making one likely to use this context
when interpreting the ambiguous homonym c term, bark. If
participants are biased by this context, they will interpret the c-
term bark in terms of an animal (the noise a dog makes) and
select the answer dog. In the multiple-choice options, we in-
cluded two incorrect but contextually relevant associates (one
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high associate and one low associate: dog and meow, respec-
tively) to determine whether participants are biased towards
using semantic associations rather than relational mapping to
solve these problems. Alternatively, when given the multiple-
choice options, if one reasons correctly that fur is the outside
of a bear, one will apply this relation analytically to the c term,
the homonym bark, and correctly reason the solution that bark
is the outside of a tree. A further associate of this correct
context is also provided, other than the correct answer, which
in this example is the word branch. If participants incorrectly
select this solution word during the task it would suggest that
although they are able to inhibit the incorrect meaning of the
homonym (or even interpret the homonym with the required
meaning to solve the problem, without any consideration of
the a and b terms) they might still reason incorrectly.
In summary, there are a number of critical differences be-
tween standard proportional analogies and our newly created
homonym analogies. The first important difference is that the
c term used in these new analogies is a homonym, that is, a
term that can have multiple meanings in different contexts and
which is therefore ambiguous in nature. Second, the a and b
terms in a given homonym analogy set a context related to one
of the meanings of the c term, specifically, a context that is not
related to the solution to the analogy. Third, the d term used to
solve the analogy requires participants to inhibit the context
created by the a and b terms and to access the alternative
meaning of the c term in order to achieve the solution.
A final difference is that participants are asked to select the
analogy solution from among four multiple-choice options.
This is a deviation from the methodology employed in
Experiment 1, in which participants were asked to generate
the d term response to standard verbal proportional analogies.
A multiple-choice response paradigm was adopted with the
homonym analogies so that it was possible to analyze specific
types of errors provided to these problems by participants. The
options consisted of the correct solution and three incorrect
choices that were carefully selected to fall into one of three
categories: (1) a correct context associate – a term that is
semantically related to the correct solution, which also re-
quires participants to access the correct meaning of the hom-
onym; (2) an incorrect context high associate – a term that is
highly semantically associated to the homonymwhen taken in
the context of the a and b terms of the analogy, but which is
incorrect when one achieves an effective relational mapping
from the a and b terms to the c term; and (3) an incorrect
context low associate – a term that is a low semantic associate
of the homonym when taken in the context of the a and b
terms of the analogy, but which is again incorrect when one
achieves an effective relational mapping from the a and b
terms to the c term.
When constructing the multiple choice items from which
participants selected their final answer, written word frequen-
cy was controlled using the Kucera-Francis written word fre-
quency scores obtained from the MRC Psycholinguistic
Database (Coltheart, 1981). A highest word frequency item
from the four that were presented occurred as a critical item
and the incorrect context high associate on three instances, and
as a correct context associate and incorrect context low asso-
ciate on two instances each. Therefore, any multiple choice
answer type (see Table 2 for examples) was not likely to be
consistently selected based on dominant written-word fre-
quency alone.
Given the multiple contextual interpretations of homonym
terms, it is important to consider the dominance of any single
homonym context in comparison to its counterpart meanings.
To do this, we consulted Twilley, Dixon, Taylor, and Clark’s
(1994) frequency norms for the different meanings of our
critical homonym c terms. Drawing on the previously utilized
analogy example with the homonym bark, Twilley et al.
(1994) noted the primary context is in terms of dog and sec-
ondarily in terms of tree. Therefore, the overall analogy is
consistent with the dominant homonym context (animals or
dog), while the correct answer context (bark in terms of the
outer lining of a tree) is consistent with the second dominant
meaning of the homonym. We consider the effects of hom-
onym dominance in terms of responses to homonym analogies
with Experiment 2a. In Experiment 2a, we collected norms for
these new types of problems by having participants solve a set
of homonym analogies.
Method
Participants
Fifty-six participants (9males; 47 females) aged 16 to 18 years
old took part in this experiment. All participants aged 18 and
over provided written informed consent prior to the experi-
ment, and for those aged 16 or 17 years, parental consent was
sought prior to participation. At the end of the experiment, all
participants were fully debriefed about the purpose of the
experiment.
Design
A within-participant design was used, with each participant
completing a selection of three out of nine homonym
Table 2 Multiple choice answers for the homonym analogy ‘fur is to
bear, as bark is to tree.’
Multiple choice answers Example item
Correct answer Tree
Correct context associate Branch
Incorrect context high associate Dog
Incorrect context low associate Meow
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analogies. The order of analogies was randomized. Because
the answer to the homonym analogy is the opposite context to
that presented in the analogy, this may have become apparent
to participants after solving a number of them. Participants
were therefore asked to complete three out of nine analogies
in order to prevent practice effects at solving these problems.
This issue was addressed in Experiment 2b by the introduction
of non-homonym analogies similar to those used in
Experiment 1, which served as distractor problems.
Materials and procedure
The analogical reasoning problems utilized in this experiment
were the newly formed homonym analogies. Nine such anal-
ogies were created (see Appendix B). For each analogical
reasoning problem participants were provided with four pos-
sible answers to choose from. One of these was the correct
solution, and then there were also three possible foils: a correct
context associate, an incorrect context high associate, and an
incorrect context low associate.
The procedure was identical to the problem-solving com-
ponent in Experiment 1, with the exception that participants
completed three of nine homonym analogies. Furthermore,
participants were asked to choose an answer from one of four
provided. These options were displayed directly underneath
the analogy and labeled a to d. The position of the correct
answer in terms of a to d was randomized.
Results
The percentage of participants solving each homonym analo-
gy within the time limit was calculated along with mean solu-
tion times. Overall, solution rates for homonym analogies
were at .68 (SD = .26) and solution times averaged 10.54 s
(SD = 6.07). Table 3 shows the proportion correct per analogy.
In addition to solution times and rates, we were interested in
the types of errors participants made on these new homonym
analogies. In particular, we were interested in which of three
incorrect choices participants made when they were unable to
solve the analogy correctly and how quickly they made these
errors. Errors were categorized into one of three possible types
for each analogy based on their selection on the multiple-
choice portion of the task. Errors were defined as correct con-
text associate errors, incorrect context high associate errors, or
incorrect context low associate errors (see Table 4).
A one-way ANOVA for error type (correct context
associate vs. incorrect context high associate vs. incorrect
context low associate) was conducted on the proportion of
each error selected for the analogies. A significant main
effect was found, with post hoc pairwise comparisons
revealing that significantly more incorrect context high
associate errors were made (M = .5, SD = .48) than correct
context associate errors (M = .14, SD = .33) or incorrect
context low associate errors (M = .11, SD = .29), with the
latter two not differing significantly from one another,
F(2,110) = 14.62, p < .01, η2p = .28.
For solution times, we examined whether participants
differed between correctly and incorrectly solved analo-
gies. A paired t test revealed that solution times for correct
answers (M = 10.30s, SD = 5.02) were significantly faster
than solution times for errors (M = 15.00s, SD = 10.27),
t(41) = -3.25, p < .01.
Given that the homonyms used in the c position of the
analogy all have at least two (and sometimes three or four)
contextual meanings, it is important to consider whether the
ordinarily dominant context (regardless of the contextual in-
terpretation of the a and b terms in the analogy) influences the
types of answers selected, whether correct or incorrect. Using
the Twilley et al. (1994) norms, we obtained dominance rat-
ings for the context of each homonym (c term) in terms of
whether the incorrect analogy context afforded by the a to b
terms was consistent with the normally dominant
Table 3 Proportion correct (standard deviations in parenthesis) for each
homonym analogy
Analogy (solution) Proportion correct
run : legs :: stitch : needle .79 (.42)
table : surgery :: organ : music .36 (.49)
roar : lion :: horn : car .79 (.42)
weapon : gun :: bug : spider .88 (.32)
vowel : letter :: capital : city .83 (.39)
engrave : wood :: log : book .41 (.51)
alive : dead :: wake : sleep .95 (.22)
February : month :: date : fruit .50 (.51)
starve : eat :: fast : slow .60 (.50)
Table 4 Proportion of errors (standard deviations in parenthesis) for
each homonym analogy by error type
Analogy (solution) Correct
context
associate
Incorrect
context high
associate
Incorrect
context low
associate
run : legs :: stitch : needle .36 (.49) .41 (.50) .24 (.43)
table : surgery :: organ :music .13 (.34) .70 (.46) .17 (.37)
roar : lion :: horn : car 0 1 (0) 0
weapon : gun :: bug : spider .41 (.50) .53 (.51) .06 (.24)
vowel : letter :: capital : city .09 (.30) .81 (.40) .09 (.30)
engrave : wood :: log : book .15 (.39) .73 (.45) .12 (36)
alive : dead :: wake : sleep 0 .1 (.57) 0
February : month :: date : fruit 0 .87 (.33) .12 (.33)
starve : eat :: fast : slow .52 (.51) .24 (.44) .24 (.44)
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interpretation of the homonym, or whether the analogy answer
(i.e., the correct context) was consistent with the dominant
interpretation. Taking the analogies presented in Table 3, for
six of the nine analogies the context of the correct answer was
also the dominant context of the homonym (analogy solu-
tions—spider, slow, needle, city, car, sleep), whereas for the
remaining three analogies (analogy solutions—fruit, music,
book) the incorrect analogy context established by the a and
b terms was the dominant context (or a more dominant con-
text) than the answer context of the homonym. It was not
possible to have an even division of homonym analogies in
which the correct or incorrect context was the dominant con-
text of the homonym due to the constraints of material design
to obtain accurate homonym analogies with appropriate DRM
lists. As such, it was decided that the majority of analogies
should be within the category where the dominant context was
the answer context.
Given this, the question arises as to whether it is easier to
access the analogy solution when the required context for the
answer is also known to be the most dominant context of the
homonym (as determined by norms established by Twilley
et al., 1994). Although we cannot directly compare across
responses because participants completed three of the nine
analogies, it is possible to provide mean solution rates and
times for the analogies. The mean solution rates and times
indicated that when the answer to the analogy was consistent
with the dominant context of the homonym, participants
seemed to access the answer more readily (M = 10.52 s),
and with greater accuracy (M = .81) in comparison to when
the context established by the a and b analogy terms was more
dominant (M = 12.43 s, M = .43, respectively). This suggests
that homonym dominance might make the answer easier to
access, and the a, b, and c terms of the analogy somewhat
easier to inhibit, if the answer is consistent with the dominant
homonym interpretation.
If we take the correct context errors and incorrect context
high associate errors and look at these in terms of homonym
dominance, it would seem as if participants made, on average,
more incorrect context high associate errors when this incor-
rect context was the dominant context of the homonym (M =
.71) in comparison to when the answer or correct context was
dominant (M = .63). If we look at the correct context associate
errors, participants make more of these particular errors when
the answer context (correct context) was dominant (M = .16)
than when the context established by the a and b analogy
terms (incorrect context) was dominant (M = .08). Of course,
these effects have to be interpreted with caution, given the
overall low rate of correct context response errors overall
compared to incorrect context high associate errors, regardless
of homonym dominance. However, the fact remains that hom-
onym dominance can have an influence on response errors
inasmuch as errors tend to be consistent with the dominant
interpretation of the homonym.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2a provide evidence that errors
made while solving homonym analogies are through a bias
towards selecting the highest semantic associate to the c term
in the analogy, even when this item is incorrect. When a hom-
onym analogy was solved incorrectly, participants were sig-
nificantly more likely to have selected the highest semantic
associate of the incorrect context (i.e., the semantic associate
of c interpreting the homonym in the context set by the a and b
terms of the analogy), rather than a lower associate of the
incorrect context, or a semantic associate of the correct
context.
The tendency toward selecting the highest semantic asso-
ciate of the c term (in the context established by the a and b
items) during an error response, suggests a bias towards
selecting a high semantic associate of c, even when this item
is not the correct one when solved by an analytic process of
relational mapping. The propensity to be drawn toward solv-
ing verbal proportional analogies by semantic association is
well established, particularly in terms of how children solve
these analogies (Sternberg & Nigro, 1980; see also Ball et al.,
2010; Cheshire et al., 2007; Siegler & Svetina, 2002).
However, it is widely believed that adults utilize a more so-
phisticated process of relational mapping to arrive at the cor-
rect answer (Green et al., 2006). In contrast, what the current
analysis of the errors made during the solving of homonym
analogies suggests is that adults are also drawn to a high se-
mantic associate of the c termwhen solving verbal proportion-
al analogies. One possibility is that those making errors use
semantic association as a heuristic to aid in selecting the solu-
tion, rather than identifying the relationship between the initial
two analogy terms, and applying this to the latter part of the
analogy. In other words, people may be defaulting to the use
of semantic association rather than reasoning by means of an
analytic mapping process based on the relation that exists
between the a and b terms within the analogy. If this is the
case, we would expect that participants who are drawn to-
wards making an incorrect context high or low associate error
would also solve analogies faster than those who solve the
analogies correctly.
Previous standard forms of analogical reasoning problems
have rendered it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish
between the correct solution strategy of relational mapping
(Green et al., 2006) versus the potentially incorrect method
of solving by semantic association. This is because typical
verbal analogical problems are often confounded by the fact
that the c and d terms not only have a relational link but are
also often highly semantically associated (Howe et al., 2013).
For example, in the problem ‘pyramid is to cube as triangle is
to square,’ triangle and square are highly semantically associ-
ated, and participants might be likely to generate square in the
absence of analogical reasoning. The use of our newly
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designed homonym analogies demonstrates that the applica-
tion of this heuristic by adults can lead participants to arrive at
an incorrect solution. Indeed, the current findings suggest that
the context of the analogy is important in participants’ overall
decision when selecting a solution, such that participants are
often drawn towards an incorrect answer that fits with the
context of the homonym established by the a and b terms,
rather than the alternate context established by the c term.
Thus, the overall context and the relation to the semantic as-
sociation of cmight be important in solving typical analogies.
Furthermore, responses to homonym analogies can be in-
fluenced by the dominant context of the homonym term.
However, even when the dominant context is the correct
answer, it can be difficult to overcome the context set
by the analogy terms. Homonym dominance can lead to
errors consistent with the dominant interpretation of the
homonym. For the majority (six out of the nine) of the
homonym analogies presented in Experiment 2a, the
dominant context was the answer context (e.g., the ‘cor-
rect context’), yet participants were still drawn to mak-
ing incorrect context associate errors when solving hom-
onym analogies (and were biased by the context provid-
ed in the analogy terms), even when this was not the
dominant context of that homonym. Despite the fact that
these analogy problems seem to be solved more accu-
rately when the analogy solution context was the dom-
inant interpretation, it still did not prevent participants
from making incorrect context response errors. That is,
participants’ responses may be biased by the incorrect
context established by the a and b terms of the analogy
even when this context is a less dominant than the
correct context. Given that accuracy rates for the anal-
ogies in which the correct context is dominant were far
from ceiling, and that there were significantly more in-
correct context errors in the set of analogies where this
incorrect context was not a dominant interpretation,
homonym dominance does not entirely determine re-
sponse selection. Indeed, participants were mainly influ-
enced by the context of the a and b analogy terms
when interpreting the c term and not simply relying
on their existing knowledge base of homonym context
interpretations.
The use of homonym analogies demonstrates that errors are
made when participants have a bias to generate the solution
term in the context of the a and b components of the analogy
such that they then search for a similar semantic associate of c.
The correct solution to a homonym analogy—one that in-
volves the a–b relation—necessitates inhibition of not only
the context provided by the a and b terms, but also of the
highest semantic associate of c to this context. Research has
demonstrated that young children often struggle with inhibi-
tory control in analogy problems (e.g., Richland, Morrison, &
Holyoak, 2006). Experiment 2a provided evidence that errors
made by adult participants in analogical reasoning with hom-
onym problems can also arise from difficulty in inhibiting the
context of the analogy and the automatic spreading activation
to semantic associates of c to this context.
Experiment 2b
The aim of Experiment 2b was to ascertain if false memory
priming can help adults overcome the bias observed in
Experiment 2a, whereby they tend to generate the solution to
a proportional analogy by searching for a semantic associate
of c in the context established by the a and b terms of the
analogy. Generating a false memory at recall would be expect-
ed to make this item more salient in memory, thereby priming
the availability of this item as a solution term during subse-
quent analogical reasoning. We therefore expected that false
memory priming would benefit participants in that they would
be able to inhibit the tendency to use the heuristic in the anal-
ogy that leads to the incorrect answer, that is, simply generat-
ing a high semantic associate of c in terms of the (incorrect)
context that is established by the a and b terms of the analogy.
Method
Participants
A total of 46 females aged 18 years participated in the exper-
iment. Each participant provided written informed consent
prior to taking part in the experiment, and participants were
fully debriefed at the end. All participants were fluent in
English.
Design and materials
We employed a within-participant design similar to
Experiment 1. This consisted of one factor with two levels
(Priming: Unprimed or False Memory Primed). The experi-
ment was programmed using Psyscript and played by an
Apple Macintosh computer. Thirteen analogies were used in
this experiment (see Appendix C). Of the 13 problems, 10
critical analogies were designed such that the c term within
the analogy was a homonym term (e.g., bark as ‘the noise a
dog makes’ or, consistent with the a is to b relation in the
analogy, bark as ‘the outer lining of a tree’). The other three
analogical problems were included to form distractor items.
Three distractor items were included in the set of solved ana-
logical problems to ensure that participants did not identify a
consistent pattern within the homonym analogies such that the
answer was always the opposite context to the terms presented
within the analogy. One of these three was also a homonym
analogy, while the remaining analogies were non-homonym
analogies similar to those used in Experiment 1 (see Appendix
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A). The 10 critical analogical problems (see Appendix C)
were divided into two groups equated on the BAS of the
DRM list items associated with each analogy problem
(Group 1: Mean BAS = .33, Group 2: Mean BAS = .24). In
Group 1, four out of five analogies had the dominant interpre-
tation of the homonym as the correct context; in Group 2, this
was three out of five analogies.
For each analogical problem, participants were presented
with a choice of four items from which to select their answer.
Only one of these answers was the correct answer. For the 10
critical analogies, the three alternative responses were com-
posed of an associate of the correct answer and two associates
of an incorrect context answer.
For each analogical problem there was a linked DRM list
consisting of 12 associated words where the critical lure was
the problem solution (refer to Appendix C for the DRM lists
and the associated BAS scores). DRM-list words that overlap-
ped with the items presented in the analogical problems were
removed so that DRM items were not presented as part of any
subsequent analogy items. The single exception to this was the
word fast, which was integral to the DRM list slow and was
therefore left in the list. DRM lists were selected such that they
only primed one context (refer to Appendix C for DRM lists).
Presentation of the materials was counterbalanced such that
each analogy group served in the unprimed and primed
conditions.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1 except
that participants completed 13 analogies rather than eight.
Furthermore, participants were asked to choose an answer
from one of four provided. These options were displayed di-
rectly beneath the analogy, and were labeled a to d. The posi-
tion of the correct answer was randomized across participants.
Results
The mean analogy solution rate (proportion) and the mean
analogy solution time (seconds) were calculated for each par-
ticipant. Solution rates and times were analyzed separately in
two analyses of variance (ANOVAs). For the primed analogy
problems, solut ion rates and t imes were fur ther
conditionalized according to whether the participant produced
the critical lure item (i.e., primed and produced a false mem-
ory) or did not (i.e., primed but did not produce a false mem-
ory). Therefore, like Experiment 1, for the purposes of the
analyses there were three priming conditions (i.e. unprimed
vs. primed with no false memory vs. primed with false mem-
ory recalled). Like Experiment 1, the majority of participants
(over 75 %) contributed data to all three cells. The mean false
memory proportion was .34 (SD = .21), with the majority of
participants (78 %) having one or more false memories.
Solution rates
There was a significant main effect of priming on solution
rates, F(2, 58) = 10.3, p < .001, η2p = .26. As can be seen in
Fig. 3, and which was confirmed using post hoc pairwise
comparisons, solution rates were significantly higher in the
false memory condition when a critical lure had been pro-
duced (M = .89, SE = .05) in comparison to either false mem-
ory priming where no critical lure was produced during recall
(M = .69, SE = .04, p < .05) or the unprimed condition (M =
.62, SE = .05, p < .05). No significant difference was found
between the latter two conditions (p > .05). Figure 3 displays
solution rates for each condition.2
Solution times
There was no significant main effect of priming on solution
times, F(2, 56) = .659, p > .05. Analogical problem solutions
were solved equally fast when unprimed (M = 11.31 s, SE =
1.03), primed with no false memory (M = 11.87 s, SE = .94),
or primed with false recall of the critical lure (M = 10.56 s, SE
= 10.57). However, Mauchly’s test revealed that the assump-
tion of sphericity had been violated for the solution time data
(p = .02), indicating that there was considerable variability
across participants in solution times. Furthermore, examina-
tion of a histogram suggested that the solution time data were
bimodally distributed, in that there were two groups of solu-
tion times, reflecting participants who were fast solvers and
participants who were slow solvers.
Because of the bimodal distribution, we decided to exam-
ine solution times separately for fast solvers and slow solvers
by splitting participants on the basis of their mean solution
times for unprimed analogies. This method of splitting
solution time data into two groups of fast and slow solvers is
consistent with that described by Garner and Howe (2014)
when analyzing solution times for CRAT problems. In what
follows, we describe analyses that included the addition of
group (fast vs. slow solvers) as a post hoc between-
participants factor.
Comparing fast and slow problem solvers It should be noted
that a one-way ANOVA on solution rates revealed a margin-
ally significant difference between the fast and slow solvers,
F(1, 45) = 4.189, p =.047, where fast solvers were slightly less
accurate (M = .62) than slow solvers (M = .71) in their re-
sponses. This suggests that fast responding might generate a
speed accuracy trade-off. For the solution times, a 2 × 3 mixed
ANOVA (Group x Priming) was conducted with group as the
2 Solution rates were examined separately for only the analogies in which
the answer context corresponded with the dominant context of the hom-
onym. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there was no signifi-
cant main effect of priming on solution rates, F(2, 58) = 1.71, p > .05, for
these analogies.
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between-participants factors with two levels (fast vs. slow
solvers) and the within-participant factor of priming with three
levels (unprimed vs. primed no false memory vs. primed with
false memory). Not unexpectedly, the results showed that
there was a significant main effect of group, F(1, 27) =
323.13, p <.001, η2p = .93, with the fast solvers group solving
the analogical problems significantly more quickly (M =
9.27 s, SE = .81) than the slow solvers group (M = 14.49 s,
SE = 1.04). As before, there was no main effect of priming,
F(2, 54) = 1.51, p >.05, with problems being solved equally
quickly in the unprimed (M = 11.49 s, SE = .81), primed with
no false memory (M = 12.06 s, SE = .78), and primed with
false memory (M = 10.25 s, SE = 1.00). However, consistent
with our intuition (and Garner & Howe’s, 2014, previous
CRAT findings), there was a Group x Priming interaction,
F(2, 54) = 4.19, p <.05, η2p = .13 (see Fig. 4).
3
To ascertain the source of the significant interaction we
employed simple main effects analyses using a Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons. There was a significant
difference between fast and slow solvers in the unprimed con-
dition (p < .001) such that fast solvers completed the unprimed
analogical problems significantly faster (M = 8.24 s, SE = .64)
than the slow solvers (M = 16.32 s, SE = 1.18). Fast solvers (M
= 9.64 s, SE = 1.01) also solved the problems significantly
faster than slow solvers (M = 15.52 s, SE = 1.28) when primed
with no false memory (p < .001). However, there was no
significant difference between fast solvers (M = 9.91 s, SE =
1.42) and slow solvers (M = 11.63 s, SE = 1.82) in the primed
with a false memory condition (p > .05). This indicates that for
participants who were primed and who produced a false mem-
ory at recall, the priming effect benefits the slow solvers (i.e.,
they were as fast as the fast solvers) perhaps because the fast
solvers are already at ceiling for solution times.
Discussion
The findings from Experiment 2b demonstrate that false
memory priming of homonym analogy problems leads
to significantly higher solution rates than when those
same problems are unprimed or are primed but no false
memories are generated at recall. Moreover, the results
of Experiments 2a and 2b show that when participants
make errors in solving homonym analogies they have a
tendency to opt for a high semantic associate of the
incorrect context (in other words, the context consistent
with the a and b analogy terms), but this context bias is
frequently overcome when priming is effective. These
findings provide evidence that priming may help partic-
ipants overcome a bias with selecting the high semantic
associate consistent with the analogy problem and may
also increase a participant’s ability to inhibit the context
set by the a and b terms when interpreting the hom-
onym. From Experiment 2b it seems that falsely
recalling a non-presented critical item is linked to a
more efficient ability to inhibit the incorrect context of
the analogy and to select the correct context item in
analogical reasoning. This is consistent with the idea
that false memory primes are particularly effective at
priming problem-solving tasks (more so than true
primes), such that they have the strength to enable in-
hibition of even a dominant context in problem solving.
The present findings also extend the efficacy of false
priming in terms of the time taken to solve analogical
reasoning problems. Previous research has demonstrated
Fig. 4 Mean solution times (s) with standard errors for fast and slow
solvers as a function of priming condition
3 It is important to note that it was not possible to conduct analyses to
determine if the type of priming (unprimed vs. primed no false memory
vs. primed false memory) influenced the type of errors (correct context
associate vs. incorrect context high associate vs. incorrect context low
associate) for fast and slow solvers because there were few instances
where participants were primed (and either produced or did not produce
a false memory) and did not produce a correct response to the correspond-
ing analogy item.
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that false memory priming results in problems being
solved more quickly than those that are unprimed, but
these results are confined to analogies whose solutions
can be easily generated via spreading activation (Howe
et al., 2013). What the evidence here suggests is that
even for problems whose solutions may not be as easily
generated via spreading activation (at least to near asso-
ciates) their solutions can also be primed by false mem-
ories. Moreover, these results show that there are signif-
icant individual differences in participants’ solution
times such that a subset of participants complete ana-
logical reasoning problems with a speed that leaves lit-
tle room for any possible improvement provided by
priming (our fast solvers subset). Given that the mean
solution time for the fast solvers is approximately 8 sec-
onds, which includes reading the analogy as well as the
four response items, it is unlikely that the analogies
could be completed more rapidly than this, leaving little
room for priming effects. However, there is a subset of
participants (our slow solvers) where false memory
priming does improve solution times to levels compara-
ble to that of fast solvers, demonstrating the efficacy of
false memory priming in homonym analogy problems.
General discussion
Previous research has established that false memories
can have salutary effects (Howe, 2011; Schacter et al.,
2011). One positive effect concerns the ability of false
memories to prime solutions on problem-solving tasks
involving insight-based reasoning (i.e., CRATs; see
Howe et al., 2010b, 2011; Garner & Howe, 2014).
Indeed, false memories have proved to be more effec-
tive primes for CRAT solutions than true memories
when a delay (e.g., 1 week) has been imposed between
the time participants recall words from studied lists and
the time they are presented with CRAT problems (see
Howe et al., 2012). Previous research has also demon-
strated that simple verbal analogy problems can be
primed using false memories but not true ones (Howe
et al., 2013).
However, these findings have been restricted to con-
ditions in which priming effects may have occurred as a
result of simple spreading activation through local and
highly interconnected semantic associates. This is of
particular concern for studies examining analogical rea-
soning (Howe et al., 2013) because the problems used
there may not have required analogical reasoning per se.
That is, the problems could have been solved using
simple associations involving BAS from the a, b, and
c terms to the solution d term. This means that
participants would not have had to understand the a to
b relation in order to solve the problem.
The novel contribution of this series of experiments, ex-
tending our understanding of the adaptive consequences of
false memories, is that false memory priming occurs even in
the absence of obvious associative relations among items.
That is, the current experiments made it more difficult
to use only spreading activation through semantic asso-
ciations to solve analogical reasoning problems by elim-
inating BAS within the analogy (Experiment 1) or by
using homonym analogies (Experiments 2a and 2b). The
findings across these three experiments provide evidence
that false memories are effective primes for solutions on
analogical reasoning tasks even when those solutions
may not rely heavily (or perhaps at all) on spreading
activation through semantic associative networks. That
is, we have demonstrated for the first time that self-
generated false memories can and do prime solutions
to problem-solving tasks—verbal proportional analo-
gies—in which the BAS of the analogy terms was lim-
ited so that participants had to rely on reasoning using
the a to b relation to generate the c to d solution.
Furthermore, we have developed a novel set of anal-
ogies (termed homonym analogies) that require the inhi-
bition of semantic associates provided by the context of
the analogy in order to generate a logical (relational)
solution to the analogical reasoning problem. Although
existing knowledge based interpretation of homonyms
might influence responses to these analogies, responses
are primarily guided by interpreting the homonym in
terms of the context provided by the a, b, and c terms
of the analogy. False memory priming of the correct
solution facilitated participants’ analogical reasoning
not only in terms of solution rates but also in how
quickly solutions were achieved (at least for participants
who were not already at or near ceiling). Interestingly,
when participants make errors on these analogies they
do so with items that would have been generated via
spreading activation through semantic associates. Of
course, it is premature to conclude that adults’ (like
children’s) default analogical reasoning heuristic is a
search through associative networks, ones created by
the biasing context of the homonym analogy itself.
However, it is clear that false memory priming facili-
tates analogical reasoning either through the inhibition
of this initial biasing context or through refocusing the
search for a solution to networks related to the false
memory (or both).
Indeed, our findings do not rule out the idea that
adults may still use spreading activation through seman-
tic associative networks to solve analogical reasoning
problems. Although the two interpretations of the hom-
onym (one provided by the false memory that has been
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generated and the other by the biasing context of the
analogy) may not be compatible inasmuch as they are
not ‘located’ in the same semantic neighborhoods, both
interpretations will be active in associative memory at
the same time. Of course, that two disparate interpreta-
tions of the same concept are active in memory at the
same time is not unheard of and in some circumstances
is fully anticipated (e.g., Brainerd, Wang, & Reyna,
2013; Nelson et al., 2003, 2013).
However, the question remains as to how adults rec-
oncile these two interpretations, inhibit the more recent
contextual bias from the analogy, and supplant it with
the solution from the older false memory context. One
likely possibility is that participants use the a to b re-
lation to search for an alternative interpretation that is
the solution to the analogy. Furthermore, it could be
that the increased activation of a concept, through a
process such as spreading activation, leads to increased
fluidity of the concept, enabling its use in solving hom-
onym analogies regardless of the context or interpreta-
tion. It is important to note that this increased activation
and accessibility is limited to situations in which the
critical lure is produced during recall; those circum-
stances in which the lure is not falsely recalled produce
no beneficial priming effect in standard or homonym
analogies. Critical lures that have been activated during
DRM list presentation are still above threshold activa-
tion levels and remain highly active in memory when
participants are solving the analogies, making them
more accessible as a solution. Therefore, when
performing a search for an alternative interpretation for
a homonym analogy, false memory priming works be-
cause this alternative interpretation of the homonym is
already active in memory, making this search process
less difficult. Critical lures that were activated but not
falsely recalled are thought to have either dropped be-
low the activation threshold required for priming after
being rejected or inhibited during test, or to have not
been activated sufficiently above the threshold required
for priming during study, thus reducing their accessibil-
ity when interpreting the meaning of a homonym
analogy.
Whether homonym analogies are solved by applying
the a to b relation to the c term to the generate d term
or by searching the two distant neighborhoods of se-
mantic associates that were recently activated for the
homonym (or, indeed, by some combination of both)
must await further research. However, the importance
of the current results is that regardless of whether adults
use semantic search, analytic mapping processes, or
both, false memories can have some very positive ef-
fects inasmuch as they provide a powerful priming
mechanism for solving problems.
These findings are not just important from a theoret-
ical perspective; they carry with them some interesting
everyday ramifications. This is because, as mentioned
earlier, false memories occur frequently in a number of
different contexts, both in and out of the laboratory (see
Brainerd & Reyna, 2012; Howe, 2013). Often, these
semantically activated false memories arise spontaneous-
ly and automatically, outside of the rememberer’s con-
scious awareness. In the world outside of the laboratory,
perhaps the best known consequences of these false
memories are those that have given rise to courtroom
allegations of offences that may never have occurred
(Howe, 2013; Schacter & Loftus, 2013). Indeed, as
shown in the current research, false memories can and
do serve as the basis for reasoning and decision making,
and arguably do so not just in the laboratory context
but in any number of everyday contexts. For example,
continuing with the forensic theme, it is not just com-
plainants’ false memories that can lead to decisions to
prosecute; jurors’ false memories can lead to potential
miscarriages of justice. Seminal work by Pennington
and Hastie (1986, 1990, 1991, 1992) has shown that
jurors activate story schemas based on their attempts
to understand and integrate trial evidence. These
schemas not only serve an organizing function but also
serve to bias additional pieces of evidence as the trial
proceeds. Worse, jurors can form false, schema-
consistent memories for Bfacts^ that are not actually in
evidence. Because jury deliberations involve reasoning
from such (biased) evidence, decision making as to a
complainant’s guilt or innocence will be influenced not
just by correct recollections of the evidence but also by
(false) memories of facts not in evidence, ones that
were semantically activated when the juror’s story sche-
ma was invoked.
The role of false memories in jury decision making is made
more ominous given that trials usually involve considerable
negative emotional content (e.g., sadness, anger, fear; see
Nuñez, Schweitzer, Chai, & Myers, in press). The evidence
reviewed earlier (e.g., Howe et al., 2010a) shows that negative
false memories not only persist over time but can also increase
over a retention interval (e.g., during the course of a trial). This
is thought to be due to negative information beingmore dense-
ly interrelated than other types of information (Talmi, Luk,
McGarry, & Moscovitch, 2007), which in turn makes spread-
ing activation more likely through such associative networks.
Indeed, previous laboratory-based research has shown that
negative false memories serve as better primes than neutral
false memories during an insight-based problem-solving ex-
ercise (e.g., Garner & Howe, 2014).
What these observations suggest is that because false mem-
ories can play a role in everyday cognition, including reason-
ing and decision making, there is a need to study their
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influence, both in controlled laboratory conditions as well as
in more naturalistic settings. Indeed, studies have shown that
false memories not only serve as powerful primes in children’s
and adults’ reasoning tasks (e.g., Howe et al., 2011, 2013),
some of which are used to assess intelligence and creativity,
but they also play a key role in tasks frequently used to assess
more perceptual components of intelligence (e.g., perceptual
closure tasks; see Otgaar, Howe, van Beers, van Hoof, &
Bronzwaer, 2015). Understanding the pivotal role false mem-
ories play in remembering the past, interpreting the present,
and planning for the future (see Howe, 2011; Schacter et al.,
2011) is essential if we are to have a complete picture of the
importance of memory in everyday cognition.
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Appendix A
Experiment 1: Analogies and Associated DRM Lists
Group A Analogies and DRM Lists (with BAS)
wash : clean :: press : iron
car : roundabout :: moon : earth
peace : dove :: courage : lion
egg : yolk :: plum : stone
iron: ore, steel, metal, crease, starch, steam, wrinkle, rust,
copper, calcium, element, magnet (.10)
earth: planet, world, geology, ground, gravity, environment,
worm, heaven, sphere, globe, core, atmosphere (.15)
lion: tiger, circus, jungle, tamer, den, cub, Africa, mane, cage,
feline, roar, fierce (.16)
stone: pebble, rock, granite, kidney, sapphire, gem, brick,
statue, marble, gravel, stick, tomb (.14)
Group B Analogies and DRM Lists (with BAS)
leopard : spots :: chest : hair
four : cat :: eight : spider
watch : cog :: compass : needle
prevent : restrict :: enable : allow
hair: strand, brush, scalp, lice, conditioner, comb, shampoo,
headband, dandruff, mousse, bald, clippers (.31)
spider: web, insect, bug, fright, fly, arachnid, crawl, tarantula,
poison, bite, creepy, feelers (.19)
needle: thread, pink, eye, sewing, sharp, point, prick, thimble,
haystack, thorn, hurt, injection (.20)
allow: permit, let, permission, forbid, disallow, forbidden,
prohibit, accept, admit, ban, admission, deny (.10)
Appendix B
Appendix C
Experiment 2b Analogical Problems and DRM Lists
Group A Analogies (with multiple-choice A, B, and C errors,
respectively) and DRM Lists (with BAS)
weapon : gun :: bug : spider (phobia, spy, deception)
starve : eat :: fast : slow (still, food, snack)
February : month :: date : fruit (cocktail, schedule, calendar)
run : legs :: stitch : needle (cloth, exercise, pain)
engrave : wood :: log : book (story, tree, branch)
spider: web, insect, bug, fright, fly, arachnid, crawl, tarantula,
poison, bite, creepy, feelers (.19)
slow: fast, lethargic, stop, listless, snail, cautious, delay, traffic,
turtle, speed, wait, sluggish (.17)
fruit: apple, vegetable, orange, kiwi, citrus, ripe, pear, banana,
berry, cherry, basket, juice (.25)
needle: thread, pink, eye, sewing, sharp, point, prick, thimble,
haystack, thorn, hurt, injection (.20)
book: text, library, chapter, novel, publisher, author, literature,
reader, page, magazine, read, title. (.52)
Group B Analogies (with multiple-choice A, B, and C errors,
respectively) and DRM Lists (with BAS)
vowel : letter :: capital : city (address, alphabet, number)
arithmetic : calculator :: rule : king (castle, measure, depth)
table : surgery :: organ : music (piano, heart, donor)
Table 5 Analogies normed in Experiment 2a
Analogy (solution) MC foils
Correct
context
Incorrect
context high
associate
Incorrect
context low
associate
run : legs :: stitch : needle cloth exercise pain
table : surgery :: organ : music piano heart donor
roar : lion :: horn : car race rhino Africa
weapon : gun :: bug : spider phobia spy deception
vowel : letter :: capital : city address alphabet number
engrave : wood :: log : book story tree branch
alive : dead :: wake : sleep peace funeral grave
February : month :: date : fruit cocktail calendar schedule
starve : eat :: fast : slow still food snack
Note. MC = Multiple choice.
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roar : lion :: horn : car (race, rhino, Africa)
alive : dead :: wake : sleep (peace, funeral, grave)
city: town, crowded, state, slum, streets, subway, country,
New York, village, metropolis, big, Chicago (.17)
king: queen, England, crown, prince, George, dictator, palace,
throne, chess, subjects, monarch (.25)
music: sound, harp, sing, radio, band, melody, stereo, concert,
instrument, symphony, jazz, rhythm. (.24)
car: truck, bus, train, automobile, vehicle, drive, jeep, Ford,
keys, garage, highway, van (.35)
sleep: rest, awake, bed, tired, dream, snooze, blanket, doze,
slumber, snore, nap, yawn, drowsy (.46)
Non-critical distractor analogies:
(non-homonym distractor) caterpillar : tadpole :: butterfly :
frog (cocoon, monarch, moth)
(non-homonym distractor) weep : sad :: laugh : happy (cheer,
joke, silly)
(homonym distractor) fur : bear :: bark : tree (leaf, orchard,
log)
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